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A Primer on Social Security Systems and Reforms
Craig P. Aubuchon, Juan C. Conesa, and Carlos Garriga
This article reviews the characteristics of different social security systems. Many configurations
arise depending on the nature of a system’s funding and determination of benefits. Many reforms
propose changing the social security systems. The authors focus their analysis of the transition
from a pay-as-you-go to a fully funded system. They argue that the key component of any reform
is the treatment of the implicit liabilities of a country’s social security system. The welfare gains
accruing to some cohorts as a result of such reforms usually stem from either a partial or complete
default on the implicit debt of the system, and in that sense the gains imply only a redistribution
of welfare across agents. In contrast, the elimination of existing distortions in social security financ-
ing can generate efficiency gains, allowing for welfare improvements for all agents. This result
shifts the focus from the nature of the system itself and centers the debate on the distortions
associated with social security. (JEL H2, E62, D31)
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based on individual contributions paid over
time. In such systems, future obligations are
fully funded by earlier contributions.
Financial sustainability of the U.S. Social
Security system is an important policy concern
because of the aging population, particularly the
baby boom cohorts. The recent recession, com-
bined with the renewed political focus on
health care and long-term health costs, has led
to increased interest in the long-run financial
stability of the U.S. Social Security system. While
the Board of Trustees of OASDI has expressed
the need for long-term reform for several years,
their 2009 report described how lower gross
domestic product (GDP) and fewer covered
workers affect the long-term outlook (see Board
of Trustees, 2009). The Board moved forward its
projections for the year in which outlays will
exceed revenues (2016) and the year in which
S
ocial security,” by its simplest defini-
tion, is a contract between a government
and its constituents. Under this contract,
citizens provide funding to a social
security system, and in exchange they receive
benefits from the system during their nonwork-
ing years, generally during old age or prolonged
illness (disability). The U.S. Social Security sys-
tem was implemented in 1935 under President
Franklin Roosevelt. This system, formally known
as Old-Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance
(OASDI), is a pay-as-you-go (PAYG) system in
which workers provide financing through a
Social Security tax; these contributions provide
benefits to the currently retired or disabled. The
system requires an implicit guarantee that future
generations will then provide the same support
for them. In contrast, fully funded (FF) social
security systems require that benefits accrue
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2010 Trustees Summary Report concludes that
these imbalances “demonstrate the need for
timely and effective action. The sooner the solu-
tions are adopted, the more varied and gradual
they can be” (see Social Security and Medicare
Boards of Trustees, 2010). These solutions include
higher taxes, lower benefits, or a combination of
both to replenish the trust fund. However, some
analysts advocate a transition to an FF Social
Security system.
Building on the seminal work of Auerbach
and Kotlikoff (1987), several quantitative analy-
ses simulate the transition from a PAYG to an FF
system and find substantial efficiency and welfare
gains in the long run. However, the gains often
come at the expense of the transition generation.
For example, Huang, Selahattin, and Sargent
(1997) show that partial or full privatization
implies large short-run welfare losses that cannot
be compensated by the long-run gains. Conesa
and Krueger (1999) show that in the presence of
uninsurable labor income uncertainty the welfare
losses of the initial cohorts are large and constitute
a political barrier to potential reforms. In contrast,
a large empirical literature argues that the macro-
economic effects of privatizations have been small,
particularly with regard to aggregate saving rates.1
The objective of this paper is to provide a
theoretical framework to illustrate the effects of
reforming social security. We use a simple over-
lapping generations model to demonstrate when
a transition from a PAYG system to an FF system
can (and cannot) be welfare improving for all
households in the economy. The model includes
the initial generations alive at the beginning of
the reform as well as future generations. We first
show that a PAYG system and an FF system can
be equivalent by using a simple government trans-
fer mechanism that makes explicit the implicit
debt of the PAYG system. This is nothing more
than the recognition of the implicit liability of
the social security system with future generations.
An immediate application of the equivalence
result is that it would be straightforward to engi-
neer a Pareto-neutral social security transition.
The equivalent FF system produces the same level
of welfare, household decisions (i.e., labor supply
and consumption), and output. If the reform
implies only the recognition of the implicit debt
with no welfare effects, how can this be reconciled
with the sizable welfare gains noted in the litera-
ture? In most simulations of reforms, pensions
and social security contributions are eliminated
over time in some arbitrary way. Generally, most
such exercises imply some partial or complete
default on promises (equivalent to a default on
the implicit debt of social security), which was
the root of the large welfare losses of the transi-
tion cohorts. When the government is allowed to
default on the implicit liabilities, the welfare of
either existing or future cohorts—but not both—
can be improved. Therefore, the post-reform
welfare gains by some individuals are the result
of not honoring these liabilities and not of the
reform itself. The equivalence result shows that
when the implicit debt is honored, there is no
room for welfare improvements in the event of 
a privatization.
Because intergenerational redistribution
alone cannot generate Pareto improvements in a
dynamically efficient economy, these improve-
ments are possible if and only if there are distor-
tions in social security financing or in the tax
system. In such circumstances, the presence of
additional distortions, not the reform itself, is the
key to any welfare improvement. Therefore, siz-
able welfare gains are possible when substantial
economic distortions occur, but welfare gains are
negligible if the social security contributions and
the tax code are close to optimal. These results
might explain why the empirical literature has
found small macroeconomic effects resulting from
many reforms in actual economies. Our exercise
suggests that no macroeconomic and welfare
effects should be expected unless distortions
are minimized or eliminated. Successful reform
requires some substance, not just relabeling of
government debt.
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1 Coronado (2002) finds that after the 1981 Chilean social security
reform (covered in the next section), wealthy families increased
aggregate savings by approximately 7 percent. In contrast, Butelman
and Gallego (2000) find that low-income Chilean households
increased their level of debt. Disney, Emmerson, and Smith (2003)
and Granville and Mallick (2002) find no effect on aggregate house-
hold saving rates after the 1986 U.K. reforms.OVERVIEW OF SOCIAL SECURITY
SYSTEMS
Not all social security systems are designed
the same. Obviously, different countries have
defined their social security contracts according
to the principles that shape their cultures and
economies. In general, there are four broad types
of social security systems. These systems com-
bine two elements. First, a system can either be
unfunded (such as a PAYG system) or FF (based
on accumulated assets). Second, a system can
provide payments based on either defined benefits
or defined contributions. Note that an FF system
is not the same as a privatized system. An FF
system is simply a model for savings and usually
represents a switch from a defined-benefit to a
defined-contribution system.2 Diamond (1996)
states, “I think that the distinction between con-
tribution and benefit base is more illuminating
than the distinction between privatization and
government-run systems, for various pieces of
either type of system can be privatized” (p. 75).
Table 1 summarizes the different configurations
of social security systems.
In 1994, the World Bank released a compre-
hensive review, Averting the Old Age Crisis:
Policies to Protect the Old and Promote Growth,
and advocated a three-pillar model to social secu-
rity. The three pillars have been broadly inter-
preted as the World Bank model and consist of
(i) a publicly managed, unfunded, defined-benefit
pillar; (ii) a privately managed, funded, defined-
contribution pillar; and (iii) a voluntary savings
pillar. Orszag and Stiglitz (1999) point out that
the World Bank did not explicitly argue for a
privately managed second pillar but that many
scholars have interpreted it as such.3 This three-
pillar approach should sound familiar to most
Americans: Those who participate in Social
Security through payroll taxes, save through a
401(k) plan or individual retirement account
(IRA), and manage their own private assets engage
in the three pillars advocated by the World Bank.
Many workers are inadequately prepared for
retirement because they do not participate in the
voluntary second and third pillars. According
to the 2007 Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF),
only 60.9 percent of U.S. households 55 to 64
years of age have a retirement account outside
Social Security and only 41.6 percent of house-
holds 35 years of age and younger have a retire-
ment account in place (see Federal Reserve Board,
Aubuchon, Conesa, Garriga
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS REVIEW JANUARY/FEBRUARY 2011 21
2 Diamond (2004) gives an alternative definition of “defined contri-
bution” and notes that the heart of a defined-contribution system
is the fact that the risk to future outcomes is on the side of benefits,
which are a function of the realized returns on funded contribu-
tions. This is in contrast to the risk of an unfunded system, which
generally falls on future taxes.
Table 1
Configurations of Social Security Systems
Type of plan Funded  Unfunded
Defined benefit Traditional employer pension United States
(example: Switzerland) Australia
United Kingdom





Notional defined contribution Italy
Sweden
3 For a recent example, see the February 2009 testimony of Alicia
Munnell and Peter Drucker before the U.S. House of Representa  -
tives; they articulate that a strong second pillar of an FF defined-
contribution plan will help diversify risk and improve retirement
portfolios.2007).4 Across all ages, the SCF finds that 57.7
percent of families have some rights to a defined-
benefit pension or account plan through a current
or past employer. Thus, for any combination of
reasons, a large majority of families have chosen
not to participate in retirement savings outside
Social Security, even though Social Security is
designed to replace only 40 percent of pre-
retirement income for the average worker retiring
in 2007 (Social Security Administration, 2008).
The differences across systems (see Table 1) are
explained next.
Funded Defined-Contribution System
Current private pensions, such as 401(k) plans
and Roth IRAs, are a type of funded defined-
contribution system. Workers contribute a per-
centage of their salaries during working years,
often with a matching employer contribution up
to an established limit. Workers are free to choose
the investment of their funds and are eligible to
withdraw their savings during their retirement
years, with a total sum equal to their defined
contribution plus investment earnings. Chile’s
social security reform in 1981 remains the best-
known international example of an FF defined-
contribution system; Diamond (1996) presents a
survey of the literature examining the pros and
cons of this model. Under the Chilean system,
all workers are required to contribute 10 percent
of their salary into a savings plan of their choice,
which is administered and regulated by the
Administradora de Fondos de Pensiones. As in
the United States, eligibility for retirement is based
on age and early retirement is available to those
with sufficient accumulated savings. At retire-
ment, workers can choose monthly withdrawals
or purchase an annuity. Furthermore, workers
are guaranteed a minimum pension paid from the
general revenue fund. In Chile, the benefits of
such a system include reduced exposure to politi-
cal and demographic risk since retirement benefits
are funded and cannot be reduced through taxes.
Several other countries, including most of
Latin America, have a funded defined-contribution
pillar that follows Chile’s example. Valdés-Prieto
(1998) presents a summary of the reforms in Peru,
Colombia, Argentina, Bolivia, Mexico, El Salvador,
and Uruguay. He offers five reasons why Chile’s
model is so successful, including low levels of
private-sector corruption, little political pressure
on investment options, and successful implemen-
tation of a redistributive means-tested benefit to
workers not covered by the Administradora de
Fondos de Pensiones.
Bateman and Piggot (1998) summarize the
pension reforms in Australia and the success of
its funded defined-contribution pillar, the super-
annuation guarantee. The Australian system oper-
ates under a model similar to Chile’s with the
exceptions that fund choices for each pension
are governed by a board of trustees and assets and
allocation are unrestricted. Australia’s system is
also unique in that taxes are levied at all three
possible points—contributions, investment earn-
ings, and benefits. Finally, Australia offers the
choice of either a lump-sum payment or an annu-
ity at retirement. The lump-sum payment is
unique among funded defined-contribution plans;
the authors point out that from a societal perspec-
tive, the policy is inefficient because individuals
who spend their lump sums must then rely on
the state.
The U.K. system also offers a privatized,
funded defined-contribution system but a unique
one, in that it allows workers to opt out of their
public, unfunded defined-benefit system. Indeed,
as Johnson (1998) reports, between 1988 and 1992,
the United Kingdom offered an additional 2 per-
cent “incentive” rebate to workers switching to a
private pension. Thus, an unfunded future benefit
is replaced with a currently funded contribution.
Johnson notes that younger workers benefit more
from switching and, as expected, have done so
in large numbers. However, studies have also
shown that many workers have opted out of an
occupational pension program to join the private
pension, in essence giving up any company con-
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4 The 2007 SCF does not include annuities in this measure and notes
that some “families may have used funds from previous employ-
ment to purchase an annuity at retirement” (p. A23). The survey also
notes that among older age brackets (55 to 64 years), workers can
withdraw funds from some retirement accounts as early as age 59½.tribution to their plans. Thus, the issue of choice
has been effective for most, but some workers
have made second-best choices.
Funded Defined-Benefit System
More traditional pensions, similar to those
awarded to older U.S. workers during previous
decades, are good examples of funded defined-
benefit systems. Workers pay into the pension
system, and the corporation manages how these
contributions are invested. Workers then receive
a defined benefit at retirement, which is usually
based on years of service or some other related
measure.
Switzerland currently offers a hybrid system:
a funded defined-contribution system with a
guaranteed return. The burden of the Swiss com-
pulsory occupational pension scheme (overseen
by a trustee board) is placed directly on individ-
ual corporations. The board chooses the pension
insurance and the amount and is responsible for
enrolling workers. Workers contribute 17 percent
of their salary, half of which is matched by the
corporation. Under these requirements, the system
is purely a defined-contribution plan. However,
each pension plan is required to return a minimum
of 4 percent nominal interest each year.5 If a
pension plan is ever underfunded, the firm or
corporation must make up the difference. This
legal, and explicit, guarantee on returns makes
the Swiss system more of a defined-benefit plan
since workers know with some certainty the
value of their future annuity.
Unfunded Defined-Benefit System
A publicly operated, unfunded defined-benefit
plan constitutes the first pillar of social security
among most countries. These systems are often
described as PAYG because current workers pay
taxes to provide a benefit to the current retired
generation. An individual’s benefits are offered
either as means-tested, such that a worker receives
benefits only if they are below an income thresh-
old or as a universal benefit given to all workers,
often calculated as a percentage of the earnings
average over a set number of working years.
Benefits are also linked to either wage growth or
price growth so that benefits stay roughly in line
with the cost of living. The U.S. Social Security
system is generally considered an unfunded
defined-benefit system. Workers pay into the
system through a tax, which is then transferred
to the current retired generation in the form of a
defined benefit. In the United States, the universal
benefit is based on a worker’s average earnings
over a 35-year period, up to a certain income level.
Furthermore, under the U.S. system, benefits
are also provided to spouses and dependents.
Diamond (2004) asserts that the unfunded nature
of U.S. Social Security makes sense given the
early decision to redistribute wealth and provide
full benefits to the initial generation—which did
not pay into the system—because the incomplete-
funding risk is shared across future cohorts. An
upcoming section outlines the model for a PAYG
system that generates this type of redistribution.
Unfunded defined-benefit plans are generally
useful for a redistribution of wealth—that is, to
help guarantee a minimum level of income for
any worker who participates in the labor force
for an agreed-upon number of years. Unfunded
defined-benefit plans often favor workers with
lower incomes or with noncontinuous work his-
tories. Often, the benefit is set at a basic subsis-
tence level and is intended to be supplemented
with other retirement savings. For example,
Switzerland provides a guaranteed minimum pen-
sion for its entire population, with the pension
paid from general revenues. Hence, the minimum
pension is independent of a worker’s salary or
time in the labor force. This universal benefit
redistributes income to poorer workers during
their retirement years.
Australia and the United Kingdom, among
other countries, have a public, unfunded, defined-
benefit system as a first pillar for social security.
In particular, the United Kingdom has a two-tier
state pension scheme. First, workers are provided
a basic state pension, paid at a single flat rate that
Aubuchon, Conesa, Garriga
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5 The 4 percent rate was chosen to be slightly below the long-run
return on Swiss government bonds of 4.5 percent. Hepp (1998)
summarizes, “The return guarantee was deemed unambitious
enough to avoid frequent funding shortfalls...but explicit enough
to enhance the credibility of the system” (p. 536).offers a subsistence-level income.6 Most workers
are covered by occupational pension schemes,
which, in one form or another, predate the state
scheme; for workers not covered by the occupa-
tional program, the state also offers the State
Earning Related Pension Scheme (SERPS). A
unique feature of SERPS is that workers can opt
out of the plan and the associated National
Insurance contribution if their private pension
or occupational scheme provides a guaranteed
minimum pension equivalent to SERPS. In con-
trast, Australia offers a means-tested benefit,
such that the full-rate pension is equal to 25 per-
cent of male average earnings (40 percent for
couples), but this payment is phased out as retire-
ment income and other assets accumulated under
the other two pillars increase. Similarly, Sweden
offers a means-tested pension for workers with
no or low income. This guaranteed pension is
financed through general revenue taxes and is
independent of workers’ notional defined-
contribution (NDC) plans.
Unfunded Defined-Contribution System
Sweden and Italy are concrete examples of
countries with an unfunded defined-contribution
social security system. In recent years, both coun-
tries have switched to an NDC plan. The govern-
ment credits each worker for the taxes he or she
and the employer contribute, and then pays a
benefit equal to the worker’s contributions plus
a notional interest rate. Första AP-fonden (AP1,
one of the pension funds managing the Swedish
system) describes the Swedish income pension
system as follows: “The income pension system
is of the defined contribution type, meaning that
the size of future pension benefits depends on
the amount of contributions made and return on
the invested capital. The income pension system
is also a so-called PAYG system, which means
that the pension contributions paid in every
month are used to pay current income pension
benefits to those who have already retired.”7
However, because of the notional interest rate,
Sundén (1998) states that the Swedish plan is
“more similar to a defined benefit plan...since
the government has to cover its pension liability
through annual contributions” (p. 582).
CURRENT STATE OF U.S. SOCIAL
SECURITY
The unfunded defined-benefit plan of the
United States, known as OASDI, contains two
separate parts. The first, and the focus of this
paper, is the Old-Age and Survivors Insurance
(OASI), which pays monthly benefits to retired
workers and their families. The second compo-
nent, Disability Insurance (DI), pays monthly
benefits to disabled workers and their families.
The 2009 annual report of the Board of Trustees
presents the most-current picture of Social
Security in the United States and notes that, in
2008, almost 35 million retired workers and their
dependents and another 6 million survivors of
deceased workers received benefits. An estimated
162 million workers paid Social Security and
payroll taxes. Total benefits paid in 2008 were
$615 billion, and the Social Security Trust Fund
collected $805 billion, prompting the Trustees to
note that “the combined OASI and DI Trust Funds
are adequately financed over the next ten years”
(see Board of Trustees, 2009, p. 2). However, the
Trustees also state very clearly: “The financial
condition of the Social Security and Medicare
programs remains challenging” and that the cur-
rent PAYG system “does not satisfy the short range
test of financial adequacy.”
These long-run problems arise as the baby
boom generation begins to retire and reduces the
number of covered workers per beneficiary from
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6 Johnson and Stears (1996) point out that the basic state pension is
technically a defined-contribution scheme, since the pension is paid
only to workers who contribute taxes during 90 percent of their
working life and have Class 1 contributions on earnings of at least
52 times the weekly lower earnings limit during each working year.
Thus, to qualify for the pension at age 65, a worker must have
contributed for 44 years (male) or 39 years (female). However, the
authors note that “there are so many special provisions that virtu-
ally everyone becomes eligible, no matter what their employment
and contribution history...” (p. 1111). These exceptions include a
deduction on working years for home responsibility protection,
which helps guarantee coverage for stay-at-home caregivers.a historical average of three workers per benefi-
ciary to just two workers per beneficiary. As is
well documented elsewhere, the Board of Trustees
(2009) currently predicts that income received
will exceed benefits payments in 2016. Because
of the surplus accrued and interest generated on
these savings, the payment of benefits will not
be reduced until 2037, when the surplus is pre-
dicted to run out. At this point, the Trustees esti-
mate that under their intermediate assumptions,
payable benefits will be 76 percent of scheduled
benefits and by 2038, tax income will cover 74
percent of scheduled benefits.8
The Trustees conclude that for the trust fund
to remain solvent throughout the 75-year projec-
tion period and pay scheduled benefits at 100
percent, one of three things must happen under
business as usual.9 First, the combined payroll tax
could be immediately and permanently increased
from 12.4 percent to 14.4 percent. Second, sched-
uled benefits could be reduced by an amount
equal to an immediate and permanent reduction
of 13 percent. Or third, a general revenue transfer
equivalent to $5.3 trillion in present value terms
could be made to the trust fund.
These measures all imply a welfare loss of
some type for workers and retirees during the 75-
year projection period. An important economic
consideration to the Trustees’ conclusions is the
deadweight loss associated with an increase in
the payroll tax. With a higher tax rate the govern-
ment would collect more revenue unless the
higher taxes distort an individual’s decision on
how much to work. The revenue lost because of
a decrease in the number of hours worked (say,
from an individual declining overtime hours) is
the deadweight loss of the tax. Feldstein and
Liebman (2002) note that under standard theory,
the deadweight loss of a tax system increases with
the square of the marginal tax rate. Over time, the
increased deadweight loss makes continued tax
increases to fund a demographic shift less desir-
able since each subsequent tax increase results
in a larger deadweight loss.
In the early 1980s, the United States faced a
similar Social Security dilemma and pursued a
strategy of tax increases and delayed benefits in
the form of an increase in the normal retirement
age (NRA). The Social Security Amendments of
1983 extended the NRA from age 65 to age 67
for the cohort of workers that turns 62 in 2022.
Diamond (1996) provides a summary of the
changes, noting that the law did not change the
minimum age (62 years) to claim retirement bene-
fits, nor did it extend the age to obtain benefits
independent of earnings (70 years). Rather, it
simply changed the level of benefits as a function
of the age at which they are first claimed. With
an NRA of 65, workers can receive 80 percent of
their benefits starting at the minimum age, 62.
Under the new NRA of 67, workers receive only
70 percent of their scheduled benefit starting at
age 62. Thus, extending the NRA by two years is
the equivalent of cutting benefits by one-eighth.
Diamond also notes that extending the NRA might
have unintended consequences since there
were no corresponding benefit cuts for early
withdrawals for DI. This provides an incentive
to apply for DI benefits at the earliest date. The
loss from future income of working years and
revenue savings from the reduced benefit repre-
sents another source of potential welfare loss.
Gramlich (1998) provides a brief overview of
the recommendations from the 1994-96 Social
Security Advisory Council. This group, which
Gramlich chaired, offered three options to address
the long-run actuarial soundness of Social
Security.10 Options included 
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8 Under intermediate assumptions, the Board estimates a total fertil-
ity rate of 2 children per woman, an annual percentage change in
productivity for the total U.S. economy of 1.7 percent, an unem-
ployment rate of 5.5 percent, and an inflation rate (measured by the
consumer price index) of 2.8 percent. Jeske (2003) notes that slight
changes to the Board’s assumptions can lead to drastic changes in
the long-term forecast of Social Security. It is important to note
that these changes run both ways: With slightly higher growth
Social Security will face no funding problems, but with slightly
lower growth Social Security will be even less likely to meet
existing obligations. Jeske (2003) concludes that a PAYG system
“therefore implies a substantial amount of risk, contrary to the
amount that proponents of social security would admit” (p. 16).
9 The Trustees also note the impact of the 2007-09 recession on the
Social Security system and the “business as usual” scenario, includ-
ing raising estimates for the projected deficit and modeling lower
GDP growth in the upcoming years.
10 See Pecchenino and Pollard (1998) for a formal theoretical treat-
ment of the three proposals put forth by Gramlich (1998).• a Maintenance of Benefits plan, with mini-
mal changes in benefit schedules or tax
rates but a large portion of trust fund assets
invested in equities, with the goal of a
higher rate of return to restore actuarial
balance;
• a Publicly Held Individual Accounts (IAs)
plan to replace the defined-benefit system
with a large-scale defined-contribution
system, with OASDI as a weaker first pillar
that provides a poverty-line flat benefit;
• a Two-Tiered System with Privately Held
Individual Accounts plan, which Gramlich
termed the “kind and gentle” benefit cut
plan. With IAs, high-wage workers would
experience slight benefit cuts and workers
would be required to contribute to cen-
trally managed investment accounts that
convert to real annuities upon retirement.
The next subsection reviews some of the theo-
retical contributions addressing the issue of a
transition from a PAYG to an FF system, hence
providing a quantitative evaluation of many of
the reforms discussed so far.
Effects of a Transition from a 
Pay-as-You-Go to a Fully Funded System
The differences between a PAYG and an FF
social security system have been studied exten-
sively in the economic literature. Here we review
several recent papers that study the welfare
implications of the transition. For a more com-
prehensive and nuanced review of the existing
literature on social security reform, see Feldstein
and Liebman (2002) and Diamond (2004).
Kotlikoff (1998) considers intergenerational
welfare and efficiency in U.S. Social Security
reform and advocates a consumption tax to finance
the transition from a PAYG system to a defined-
contribution personal security system. Under his
model, an uncompensated welfare transition
results in significant increases to capital stock
(36.7 percent), aggregate labor supply (3.7 percent),
output (11.2 percent), and real wages (7.1 percent)
compared with the baseline model. However, this
scenario leads to short-run decreases in aggregate
welfare. Using a lump-sum redistribution author-
ity to compensate the initial generation, Kotlikoff
finds long-run efficiency and welfare gains above
the baseline scenario but below the uncompen-
sated transition. Kotlikoff concludes: “[T]he
extent to which privatization results in efficiency
gains depends on the ability of future generations
to compensate current workers for the loss of con-
sumption as a result of financing the transition”
(p. 37). Conesa and Krueger (1999) propose an
environment augmented to include uninsurable
labor income risk, hence giving a PAYG social
security system an additional role as a partial
insurance device, and show that the transition
offers similar conclusions.
Birkeland and Prescott (2007) consider an
overlapping generations model with no popula-
tion growth in both a PAYG system and an FF
system. They compare the models under four
demographic scenarios calibrated to match the
current United States and a future United States
with lower population growth and longer retire-
ments. They note that the PAYG system has little
or no explicit debt but does not fully maximize
welfare for the society. Early in their paper, the
authors challenge the notion of debt, stating “The
government debt that a country owes to its citizens
is not debt in the usual sense…[it] is a mechanism
that facilitates intergenerational borrowing and
lending, and is an integral part of a welfare-
improving saving-for-retirement system” (p. 2).
Birkeland and Prescott (2007) also note that
the Congressional Budget Office estimates that
the current implicit guarantees of the PAYG system
represent liabilities four times gross national
income. These implicit guarantees represent a
form of debt for the unborn generation, which
lowers lifetime welfare. The authors find that
with current U.S. demographic assumptions,
welfare under an FF system is 9.2 percent higher
than a PAYG system. The FF system has a higher
explicit debt-to-gross national income ratio, and
individuals work more under the FF system
because workers have a higher take-home wage
without a Social Security tax.11 Lifetime con-
11 Their model considers a population growth rate of 1 percent, an
NRA of age 65, and a 20-year retirement. Their future U.S. model
considers a country with no population growth, an NRA of age
65, and a 30-year retirement.
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States with an FF system, by 5.5 percent. While
the authors find that aggregate welfare is better
than under an FF system and note that an increase
in explicit government debt is not a burden to
future generations, they do not consider the wel-
fare of the transition generation.
Similarly, Jeske (2003) considers the transition
between social security systems and also finds
that in the long run every generation benefits
more from an FF system. In that system, individ-
ual savings are higher, which in turn increase
the aggregate capital stock. The higher capital
stock acts as a buffer to the economy in the event
of large aggregate economic shocks, which disrupt
the PAYG social security system. Jeske (2003)
argues that “private savings are more desirable
and affordable if both benefits and contributions
[to PAYG] are lower” (p. 16). As do Birkeland and
Prescott (2007), Jeske similarly acknowledges that
social security reform has beneficial long-term
effects but that, in the short run, “a large portion
of the population will be worse off...[T]he prob-
lem of privatization is the unfunded liability to
pay for current retirees” (p. 22).
Conesa and Garriga (2008) study the optimal
financing of the transition from a PAYG to an FF
system. By maximizing over the entire policy
space and following an optimal fiscal policy
approach, the authors find it is possible to finance
such a transition in a Pareto-improving manner
for all generations. In their model, the fiscal author-
ity changes the labor income tax over time: first by
lowering the labor income tax during the transi-
tion generation, issuing government debt to fund
existing obligations, and then raising taxes over
time to repay debt. Measured as equivalent vari-
ation in consumption, the authors find that in the
transition from a PAYF to an FF system future new-
born generations experience a welfare increase
between 3 percent and 8 percent. Such a scheme
allows for welfare gains for both actual and future
generations, and the key aspect is the reduction
of the distortions introduced by the tax system.
None of the above-mentioned papers consid-
ers the political ramifications of social security
reform, nor do they address the social justice
issues underlying the need for and extent of a
social security contract between a government
and its constituents. Our goal is to show the basic
mechanisms by which a shift to an FF system can,
in some cases, be welfare improving, even for
the transition generation. As Orszag and Stiglitz
(1999) point out, initial conditions matter and as
such, it is an “issue of whether a shift to individ-
ual accounts would be socially beneficial” and
not an issue of whether or not “in a tabula rasa
sense, an individual account system would have
been preferable to a public defined benefit system
in the first place” (p. 5).
A MODEL ECONOMY WITH A
PAY-AS-YOU-GO SYSTEM
We follow the framework of Samuelson (1958,
1975) and Diamond (1965) and consider the sim-
plest scenario of a two-period overlapping gener-
ations model. Individuals work during the first
period of their life and are retired during the sec-
ond period. Consider the problem faced by an
individual born in period t (who will be retired
in period t+1). During the working period, indi-
viduals provide labor, denoted as lt, and are paid
in return a wage rate per unit of labor, wt. They
consume some goods in the first period, c1,t; they
pay social security taxes on their wage income,
denoted by the tax rate, ˄t; and they can save for
the next period, at+1, where savings today are
assets that pay interest in the next period. Hence
the budget constraint for these individuals is 
(1)  
During the retirement period—which is the next
period, t+1—individuals do not produce any
goods; instead, they merely consume the principal
and interest on their private savings and their
pension payments. Therefore, their budget con-
straint is given by
(2)  
where c2,t+1 denotes the consumption during
retirement (in period t+1) of the individuals born
in period t, rt+1 denotes the interest payments
collected on savings, and pt+1 denotes the social
c a w w t t t t t t t 1 1 , . + ≤ − +   τ
c r a p t t t t 2 1 1 1 1 1 , , + + + + ≤ + ( ) +
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period t+1.
If there is no exogenous restriction on the
sign and magnitude of savings,12 both budget
constraints can be combined as 
(3)  
This expression simply states that the net present
value of consumption over the life cycle of indi-
viduals cannot be larger than the net present value
of after-tax payments (labor income when indi-
viduals are young and pensions when old). Given
this constraint, individuals would choose ￿c1,t,
c2,t+1,lt￿ given ￿˄t,wt,pt+1,rt+1￿ and their preferences
(i.e., how much they value consumption in the
present with respect to consumption in the future
and how much they value consumption today
with respect to how much they dislike working).
Finally, in this world the government operates
the social security system in a standard PAYG
fashion: Social security contributions of the cur-
rent working-age population finance the pension
payments of the currently retired population. In
particular, if there are ￿1+n￿ workers per retired
person (think of n as a constant growth rate of
population), the social security system would be
balanced when
(4)  
Notice it is an unfunded system in the following
sense. The individuals born in period t will
contribute to the system ˄twtlt. However, when
they retire they will collect pensions pt+1 =
￿1+n￿˄t+1wt+1lt+1 that are not related to their own
past contributions.
A FULLY FUNDED SYSTEM 
An alternative to the implicit guarantee of
the PAYG structure is an FF system of social secu-
rity. Under our previous notation, an FF system
is a defined-contribution plan similar to a 401(k)






























program.13 In the model, workers save throughout
their lifetimes. Whether this savings program is
mandatory is irrelevant, since workers could also
save (or borrow) privately if they chose to do so.
Hence, given an optimal consumption allocation
if the government increases compulsory savings,
individuals would respond by decreasing their
private savings by the same amount.
This can be easily seen by consolidating the




t+1 = ˄twtlt denotes mandatory contribu-
tions to an IRA, computed as a fraction of current
labor income. These contributions are then capi-
talized at the market rate of return and constitute
the funding of the future retirement pension.
Hence, next period’s budget constraint will
include a pension, denoted
(6)  
where now pt+1 = ￿1+rt+1￿a
m
t+1 and therefore the
pensions are funded by defined contributions.
Notice, though, that the net present value
budget constraint is
(7)  
In other words, whether savings are compulsory
does not matter; in the end, the net present value
of consumption is independent of the level of
compulsory contributions to social security.
Effectively, then, in this simple model environ-
ment an FF system is equivalent to private savings.
COMPARISON OF THE TWO
SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEMS
We now compare the two social security sys-
tems. For simplicity, we consider a stationary
c a a w t t t
m
t t 1 1 1 , , + + ≤ + + 































13 It is important to make the distinction that it is not a necessary
condition for FF system funds to be invested in equities. As Orszag
and Stiglitz (1999) state, “...prefunding and privatization are dis-
tinct concepts, and conflating them confuses rather than informs
the debate” (p. 9). Indeed, an FF system could be fully invested in
government securities, with low risk and lower (but sometimes
guaranteed) returns.
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12 The presence, for example, of borrowing constraints might com-
plicate the analysis.world where social security contributions are con-
stant over time, ˄t+1 = ˄t; wages grow at some
constant rate g—that is, wt+1 = ￿1+g￿wt; and hours
worked by each generation of workers are also
constant, lt+1 = lt.
Under this scenario, the PAYG social security
pensions are given by
(8)  
and therefore the return of a PAYG social secu-
rity system is equal to ￿1+n￿￿1+g￿. Clearly, if 
￿1+rt+1￿ > ￿1+n￿￿1+g￿, then each individual born
in this stationary world will benefit more from a
funded system, since the right-hand side of
equation (7) is larger than the right-hand side of
equation (3).
Usually both empirical data and economic
theory tend to confirm that, on average, the return
on private investment is larger than the growth
rate of a stationary economy, ￿1+n￿￿1+g￿. Notice
that a systematic violation of this condition would
imply that an economy is inefficiently overaccu-
mulating capital (see Samuelson, 1975).
Clearly, if the return on private investment is
larger than the growth rate of the economy, one
would fare better born in a world with an FF sys-
tem than a PAYG system. Nevertheless, as previ-
ously discussed, this is the correct answer to the
wrong question. The relevant issue relates to the
following question: Given that the current world
has a PAYG social security system, is anything
gained by switching to an FF system? Answering
this question requires consideration of the events
that occur during the transition, which in our
theoretical model exists for just one period.
TRANSITION BETWEEN SOCIAL
SECURITY SYSTEMS
Transition I: Default on the Currently
Retired
Let us consider the scenario in which our
economy is operating under a PAYG structure.
Workers in this period contribute to the social
security fund by paying a social security tax,
under the assumed social contract that they will
p n w n g w t t t t t t t + + + + = + ( ) = + ( ) + ( ) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 τ τ  
in turn receive a pension benefit when they retire
during the next period. Their pension benefit will
then be paid by the young generation of the next
period, and so on.
Consider we are now in period T. Imagine
that the government decides to switch immedi-
ately to a funded system during this period
without honoring the implicit debt of the current
retirees (the workers of the previous period), that
is, pT = 0. The current old generation would incur
a welfare loss equal to the sum of the pension
obligations to the current retirees. If private sav-
ings earn a higher return than the implicit return
of the social security system, then the generation
working in period T is better off (as are all subse-
quent generations). However, the contributions
of the current workers are invested to finance their
own future pensions, a
m
T+1 = ˄twtlt. Effect  ively,
the government has defaulted on its obligations
to the currently retired. With this transition
scheme the initial cohorts of retired individuals
(or those close to retirement) bear the cost at the
expense of current young and future generations.
Transition II: Default on Future
Generations
Consider now that we decide to keep the
promise to the currently retired, and as such, we
still need to pay their pensions. We finance these
pensions by issuing debt that must be repaid
during the next period. The government budget
constraint is now BT+1 = pT and the currently
young are the only ones who absorb the new debt
(in a closed economy) and their budget constraint
becomes
(9)   
Notice than per capita debt of the young must be
(10)  
Clearly, the per capita debt of the young now is
equal to the social security contributions under
the original PAYG system. In the next period, the
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Since the rate of return on private savings (or in
government debt) is larger, the transition cohort
will benefit more than it would with the PAYG
social security system.
However, future generations will experience
a welfare loss, which can be seen by examining
the budget constraint of the workers born in
period T+1:
(12)  
These households will absorb the outstanding
debt and will have to pay taxes, denoted by tT+1.
The reason can be seen from the government
budget constraint:
(13)  
where total taxes collected equal the taxes per
worker multiplied by the number of workers;
that is, TT+1 = ￿1+n￿tT+1. Notice that in the absence
of this new tax, the outstanding debt would
explode to infinity, creating a Ponzi scheme that
cannot be in equilibrium.
To maintain a constant level of debt, BT+2 =
BT+1, the new tax should be enough to cover the
interest payments on the initial debt issued: 
(14)  
Hence households now must pay more in net
present value to the tax authority than under the
PAYG framework:
(15)
Notice that taxes paid now equal the interest
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In the PAYG regime, total taxes net of discounted
pensions paid by households are
(17)  
where the equality comes from using expression
(8).
Simple algebra shows that expression (16) is
larger than expression (17) and, as such, all future




We now consider an economy that honors
the implicit debt of the PAYG system but does not
benefit one generation at the expense of others,
as was the case in the previous two examples.
We follow the approach of Conesa and Garriga
(2008) and allow the government to issue recog-
nition bonds equal to the value of the govern-
ment’s implicit pension obligations to current
workers.14
The no-default plan could proceed as follows:
Since current workers are still paying their social
security contributions (to honor the benefits of
the current retired generation), the government
will issue these workers a direct monetary trans-
fer financed by government debt (equivalently,
recognition bonds could be issued) equal to the
net present value of their (lost) pension in the
next period. The transfer received by the current
workers is then equal to pT+1/￿1 + rT+1￿. By con-
struction, current workers are indifferent between
this arrangement and the previous PAYG system.
The budget constraints of the transition gen-
eration are now defined as
(18)  
(19)  
Notice, however, that these are the same budget
constraints as in the PAYG model, once we under-
c a b w w tr T T T T T T T T T 1 1 1 , + + ≤ − + + +   τ
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14 This idea is not restricted to the particular strategy explored in
Conesa and Garriga (2008); the term “recognition bond” has been
used elsewhere, including by Feldstein and Liebman (2002).
Diamond (1996) also highlights this example from the experience
of Chile in 1981.stand that (i) the transfer collected by workers is
equal to debt issued trT = bT+1 and (ii) principal
and interest on the debt (or the recognition bonds)
are equal to the pensions ￿1 + rT+1￿bT+1 = pT+1.
In the next period, the total amount of the
recognition bonds (or government bonds to pay
for the transfer) must be paid with interest. By
construction, though, this quantity is exactly
equal to the amount of the pensions, so the new
generation of workers born in period T+1 must
pay taxes and again be compensated by a trans-
fer in the exact manner as the previous generation,
and so on until infinity.
The introduction of recognition bonds does
not increase the level of debt for our model’s gov-
ernment; rather it makes the debt explicit. Pakko
(2009) provides a brief overview of the U.S. fed-
eral deficit and explains the distinction between
“on-budget” and “off-budget” items. Social
Security is an off-budget item and is reported
only as part of the unified budget. Currently, the
Social Security Trust Fund in the United States
is counted as a surplus since tax receipts are larger
than benefit payments. This surplus appears in
reported figures of the combined budget. For
example, in 2008 the official measure reported
by the government—the unified budget deficit—
was $455 billion. The on-budget deficit was
$638 billion, with an off-budget surplus of $183
billion, funded primarily from Social Security.
Pakko (2009) questions which deficit measure—
on-budget or unified budget—the government
will report starting in 2017 when Social Security
outlays exceed revenues. The implicit debt guar-
antee to future generations is currently not
reported, even though it is politically unlikely
that the federal government will default on these
future obligations. 
Chile approached a similar transition in
1981 by incurring no debt; instead, they began
building a fiscal surplus three years before the
reform started. Chilean GDP grew at an average
of 8 percent per year during this period, and
the high growth fueled increased tax revenue.
Diamond (1996) states that “it may be that a sur-
plus is a contributing condition for a successful
privatization” (p. 80). Valdés-Prieto (1998)
acknowledges that a surplus is sufficient, but not
a necessary condition, to reform. During a review
of the reforms in several Latin American countries
in the early and mid-1990s, he finds that even
countries emerging from hyperinflation have
successfully managed a transition by issuing debt
after the inflationary period.
Welfare-Improving Transition: 
No-Default and Lower Labor Distortions
We now use the intuition and fiscal policy
approach from Conesa and Garriga (2008, 2009)
to present the case in which a switch to an FF
defined-contribution model can be welfare
improving. The existing literature has shown
that in a dynamically efficient economy, it is not
possible to raise aggregate welfare by redistribut-
ing resources across generations (a result that goes
back to Diamond, 1965), which is basically our
approach in the previous reform scenarios. The
first two scenarios were situations in which one
cohort might benefit at the expense of others;
the last one was a Pareto-neutral privatization
(nobody won or lost; we simply made the implicit
debt explicit). However, if the economy is ineffi-
cient because of distortions, then we can increase
aggregate welfare by removing the distortions.
Furthermore, we have seen that in the case
of a decline in the labor force (or a corresponding
increase in the dependency ratio), the two policy
options are increasing the payroll tax or cutting
benefits. Increasing the payroll tax worsens the
distortion on labor.
In the baseline scenario the distortion in the
economy comes from the tax on labor, which is
used to finance the PAYG system. Pensions are
viewed as a pure transfer, while contributions
are viewed as a pure tax. Notice that actual pen-
sion systems do have some connection between
labor income and pension entitlements so that, in
reality, individuals may realize the link between
their individual contributions and their pension
entitlements, thus reducing the distortion. How  -
ever, insofar as the connection between contri-
butions and pensions is not one to one (because
of redistributive considerations usually present
in most systems), there will still be a distortion.
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looking at the equivalent economy in which the
implicit liabilities of the PAYG system have been
made explicit. From equation (18), we see that
workers are paying taxes as a function of their
labor income, ˄TwTlT, and at the same time they
are receiving a compensatory transfer, trT, inde-
pendent of their labor supply decisions. Basic
economic principles imply a deadweight loss
because of this scheme. Moreover, this distortion
would increase in the labor supply elasticity.
Reducing both the tax and the transfer would
result in an efficiency gain.
Most countries have additional distortions
that are important in studying social security
reforms. For example, mandatory retirement rules
could be eliminated during a reform, as suggested
by Conesa and Garriga (2003). Without this restric-
tion, the transition to an FF system requires a
lower level of compensating transfers and ensures
a faster convergence to the new steady state. In
addition, the government can change the tax treat-
ment of capital income of retirees as an alterna-
tive compensation mechanism. In considering




In addition to the implicit debt of the social
security system, a larger set of distortions has
been made explicit. Distortions on labor income
of the young are now denoted by ˄1,T, while the
distortion on labor income of the old is ˄2,T+1
(with compulsory retirement this is equal to 100
percent), and ʸT+1 denotes distortions on invest-
ment decisions.
Given this scenario, it is possible for a govern-
ment to reduce the distortions and generate wel-
fare improvements, implying a lower level of
compensatory transfers or a lower level of recog-
nition bonds. Such a strategy is illustrated in
Conesa and Garriga (2008, 2009). They show that
the optimal social security reform consists of
providing compensatory transfers to the initial
old generation (transfers almost as large as their
c a b w w tr T T T T T T T T T 1 1 1 1 , , + + ≤ − + + +   τ
c w r a T T T T T T T 2 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
1
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+
τ θ 
+ + ( ) + + r b T T 1 1.
social security entitlements) financed with debt
and lowering labor income taxes on impact to
increase them later.
The introduction of capital income taxes in
the analysis allows for the generation of additional
welfare gains since it drastically reduces the need
for compensatory transfers for the initial genera-
tions alive. On average, capital income taxes
translate into very large subsidies, especially for
the oldest cohorts. Effectively, changing the fiscal
treatment of capital income can become a close
substitute for compensatory lump-sum transfers
to the initial old generation.
CONCLUSION AND POLICY
IMPLICATIONS
We have examined some of the “myths” sur-
rounding social security as presented by Orsagz
and Stiglitz (1999), particularly by focusing on
comparing the transition between systems as
opposed to tabula rasa comparisons between a
PAYG and an FF system. We have presented the
findings of other researchers who have docu-
mented the welfare gain under an FF defined-
contribution system without considering the
welfare cost for the transition generation. We
build on the notion that a PAYG social security
system is just an implicit liability for the tax
authority, and as such it could be converted into
an explicit liability (i.e., government debt) with-
out cost. After such conversion the government
can focus on designing reforms without inevitably
generating welfare losses for some generations.
The key insight is that this scenario is possible
only if the distortions (introduced either by the
financing of social security or other types) are
reduced.
Hence, the focus should be shifted from the
nature of the social security system itself and the
debate centered instead on the distortions intro-
duced by all tax-transfer schemes currently pres-
ent in the economy. The debate on social security
reform then becomes a debate on how to allocate
to different cohorts the efficiency gains generated
by the reduction of these distortions.
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